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Clarity of underlying principle
Since 1970 the pace and scale of change in the field of collective labour law have
been remarkable, and it seems likely that this process of reform will continue. 1
The 1980s have seen a number of important enactments which seem to reflect a
radical view of collective labour relations.2 Sit John Wood has pointed out that, in
this difficult and fast changing legal environment, it is important to achieve "clarity
of underlying principle"3 both in our analysis of existing law and in our efforts to
predict future developments.
It may be that the search for underlying principle requires some examination of
the lessons of history. Labour legislation and the arguments that have surrounded
it have had an important influence on our social, economic and political history.
Should the law be used to underline or to dilute managerial prerogative? Should it
be used to encourage or restrain the organisation of workers into trade unions?
Some of our most respected labour law commentators might argue that there is
a sense in which both of the above questions are irrelevant, or even that it is
inappropriate even to ask them. The traditional approach to the problems of
industrial relations emphasises or even assumes that this specialised and vexed
branch of human relations should not be interfered with by the law.4 In a
democratic society where it is believed that state intervention should be avoided
unless it is demonstrably necessary, this is clearly an important approach which
recognises the limits of the law. It is equally clear, however, that Parliament and
the courts have not adopted the traditional "abstentionist" view in practice. In
particular, Parliament has intervened in collective labour relations on a regular
basis since the 1970s.5
The history of collective labour law might reveal little more than the misguided
or even malicious folly of Parliament in ignoring the abstentionist prescription, or,
"Of the School of Law, University of Buckingham.
1. During the 1989-90 parliamentary session it seems likely that the Government will introduce a Bill
to abolish the pre-entry closed shop. It is also possible that measures will be taken to restrain unofficial
or "wildcat" strikes especially those which occur in essential services.
2. Viz., the Employment Acts, 1980, 1982 and 1988 and the Trade Union Act 1984,
3. Wood, "The Collective Will and the Law" (1988) 17H.]. 1.
4. See, e.g., Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (1971), p.l; if. Howarth, (1988) 17 ILJ. 11.
5. See, e.g. Wedderburn, supra n.4; if. Kahn Freund, (1974) 3IL]. 186.
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more accurately, the lack of a prescription. Certainly, that might help to explain the
sometimes fraught state of the law and of relations between governments of all
political persuasions and the trade unions, particularly over the last 25 years.
But history may be a source of other lessons and other views. It might, for
example, point towards other considerations, perhaps non-industrial, which seem
to Parliament to have called for legislation. If it is accepted that the state has
perceived such a need in the past it is very possible that it will do so again in the
future. If that is so, it is important to identifYand analyse the conditioning factors
that operate on the legislativemind, and to see if any pattern emerges which might
help to explain the curious history of collective labour law.
The virtue of abstention and the vice oflegalism
To focus on the concerns of the state about collective labour relations is to
challenge the traditional view which calls for their autonomy from the ordinary
legal process. This traditional view requires a little further explanation. Put very
simply, the argument is as follows.
Employment is a complex relationship which is only inadequately depicted by
the legal device of the 'contract of employment'. While the law of contract in its
classical form emphasises individual responsibility and the exchange of resources
through a freely arrived at bargain, the exchange of labour for wages is a very
different kind of process. Here the idea of a free bargain is misleading because of
extreme inequality of bargaining power as between employer and employee. While
the employer typicallyrepresents considerable resources of capital, enterprise and
administration, the employee often can only represent his own strength and skill.
Generally speaking, these maybe obtained by the employer elsewhere unless there
is a severe labour shortage in the relevant industry or area. Thus the employer is
probably able to say to the employee: "These are the terms of my offer of
employment, take them or leave them." Even at this early stage in their
relationship there is a very clear disparity of economic power and it is this
imbalance that dominates employment throughout. It is a situation that does not
rest easily within the conceptual framework of the bargain or within its legal
manifestation, the law of contract. So, at this most basic level of labour relations,
the law is thought to be out of touch with reality. For example, Kahn Freund has
suggested that the employment relationship is really a command in the disguise of
a bargain.6
What is the solution to this central problem of inequality of bargaining power?
Broadly speaking two quite different ways of approaching the problem might be
suggested.
First, the state, in order to protect the public interest, might intervene to redress
the balance of the employment relationship. It might mitigate the effects of
inequality of bargaining power by withdrawing the right to bargain at all. It could
6. Kahn Freund, Labour and the Law 2nd ed. (1977), p.6.
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define the respective rights and obligations of employer and employee in a way
which leaves no room for oppression.7 But it is possible that the state would have
to do this through the legal process which, it is suggested, is inadequate to the task.
The inadequacy of the legal system in this respect, and especially that of the
courts, has been explained in a variety of ways ranging from its sheer ignorance of
the relevant issues to class prejudice8 and the suggestion that English law is
handicapped by an obsession with the power and the rights of the individual.<) As
such, law as we now know it does not offer a viable solution to the problem of
inequality of bargaining power. 10 In any event, the sheer scale of state intervention
that would be required would tend towards the totalitarian.
The traditional "abstentionist" school prefers a second and radically different
approach. Workers can mitigate the consequences of their lack of power as
individuals by combining into trade unions which will protect their collective
interests. At its most effective, this would unite a givenworkforce into a monolithic
factor of production with which the employer would have to bargain. 11 But even
here, it is argued, the law can do great damage because it has alwaysbeen hostile to
the necessary process of combination and the abstentionist can draw upon plenty
of historical evidence to support this view.12 Ideally, the law should keep its
distance from trade union organisation and from the process of collective
bargaining. There is an appropriate role for the law, but it is essentially neutral -
supporting and guaranteeing an independent system of self-regulation rather than
interfering with it or attempting to assume its functions.13
The public interest and the law
Since the 1860s Parliament has paid periodic lip-service to the 'virtue' of
abstentionism. 14 But actions speak louder than words, and the statute books reveal
an addiction to the 'vice' oflegislation.1S To be fair, some of it seems to have been
intended to support the system of collective bargaining by providing facilities for
information and conciliation or by enhancing the organisational rights of trade
unions.16 But there are other enactments which go or have gone to the very
7. This is reflected in what might be called the "pre-contractual" history of labour law when all
"employment relationships" were governed by statute and the coercive powers of the Justices of the
Peace.
8. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (1981), p.l85 et seq..
9. See Wedderburn, (1988) 17 1.L.J. 1.
10. However, the law has moved in this direction to the extent that, where a contract of employment has
existed for a certain time, statutory rights attach to it, irrespective of the express or implied intentions of
the parties, e.g. the right to redundancy payments and the right not to be unfairly dismissed.
11. The argument for trade unionism is put with some force by the U.S. Supreme Court in American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
12. See the Combination Acts 1799 and 1800 and, e.g., Hornby v. Close (1867) L.R. 2 QB. 153.
13. Arguably, this is achieved by the kind of legislation referred to in n.l 0 supra.
14. See the remarks in favour of the policy of collective laissez fiJire made by the Royal Commission on
Trade Unions in its 1869 report.
15. Especially those of the last twenty years.
16. See, e.g., Industrial Relations Act 1971 and Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974.
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substance of industrial relations by attempting to influence trade union
government, to formalise collective bargaining and bring it within the jurisdiction
of the courts or to restrain collective industrial action.17 Obviously, the vicious path
of legalism has had its attractions. Why?
One of the many functions of Parliament is to identifYwhat it is that the public
interest requires and to legislate accordingly. But what does the "public interest"
mean? It cannot be identified scientifically; it is a matter of perception. At any
given time the most important perception in legal terms is that of the political party
that governs through a majority in the House of Commons. What a government
calls the public interest is a matter of political preference underwritten by the
electorate, rather than of empirical research. The process of identifYing and
legislating for the public interest is inherently contentious.
Arguments about law and policy do not all take place within the strict
constitutional framework, to the extent that such a thing exists. The proceedings of
the House of Commons and the hustings are only the most obvious examples of
democracy at work. Many of the most compelling arguments about legislation
result from less formal but equally influential encounters between government and
sectional interests that may be affected by any change in the law. The Lord
Chancellor's recent proposals concerning the administration of justice clearly go to
the interests of the legal professions who have clearly formed a view upon them.
These views and counter-proposals are expressed as representing the public
interest but it is not entirely coincidental that they also amount to a defence of
existing rights, privileges and interests which are entirely sectional. Similar forces
are probably at work within the legislative process on a daily basis though perhaps
less publicly than in the case of reform of the legal professions. Like those
professions, organised capital and organised labour represent powerful though
perhaps wider sectional interests and there is a sense in which their historical and
current predicament is comparable to that of contemporary lawyers. Their struggle
has been for the principle of self-regulation which, to them, serves the public
interest which inevitably amounts to their own subjective perception of it.
Government and Parliament may have a rather different view, again probably
subjective but perhaps determined in the light of wider considerations or on the
advice of expert bodies. The crucial legal and constitutional question is what
happens when conflicting perceptions collide.
The dynamic and inherently controversial relationship between the "public
interest" as identified by Parliament and as identified by narrower sectional
interests is often fraught with difficulty and where the relevant sectional interest
,has enormous power at its disposal the potential for political and perhaps
constitutional crisis is clear. The argument about how much power trade unions
really have has raged for many years.18 The 'truth' about this seems to be very
17. See Industrial Relations Act 1971 and, although they are clearly not intended to formalise collective
bargaining, the Employment Acts 1980, 1982 and 1988 and the Trade Union Act 1984.
18. For a summary of some of these arguments see Arnold, The Unions (1981), passim.
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elusive. Again, perception is all important and there are sections of the public who
believe that the trade union movement and the process of collective bargaining
have the potential to affect their livesvery deeply and they expect the law to take a
view - to encourage the process, to formalise it or restrain it as circumstances
appear to them to dictate. These concerns are obviouslyof interest to Parliament.
Perhaps as important as the idea of abstentionism is the reality of government
and the aspiration that it should be conducted in the wider public interest. The
reality and the hope may have to be balanced against the technical logic of
abstention and self-regulation. The delicate and sometimes disastrous relationship
between the state and the sectional interests that are relevant to the process of
collective bargaining may be as instructive in terms of underlying principle as the
more specific relationship between capital and labour. Collective bargaining and
industrial relations generally cannot realistically be treated as an entirely private
process because they have such wide ranging effects on society as a whole. The law
is bound to reflect thiS.19
For present purposes, this historical survey focuses on the relatively narrow
issue of the relationship between the state and the trade union movement and the
development of the trade union lawwhich reflects and influences that relationship.
This is because the whole system of collective bargaining depends upon the
existence and viability of representative and effective trade unions. The
development of trade union lawmust be symptomatic of the wider concerns of the
state and its perception of the public interest.
The history of the relationship between trade unions and the state
Having explored the idea that the constitutional and political relationships
between sectional interests and the state are as important as the economic
relationships between those interests, it is time to test the idea against the reality of
the history of trade union law. The exercise should be approached with two
considerations firmly in mind: first, the extent to which the law has recognised the
importance of the relationship between trade unions and the state; secondly, the
ways in which it has attempted to regulate that relationship. For these purposes,
the development of trade union lawcan be divided into a number of distinct phases
each of which reflects a change in the nature of the relationship between labour
and the law.
Phase I - fear and prohibition
The French Revolution of 1789 caused a wave of paranoia to sweep over the
ruling classes of Europe - Great Britain was no exception. Indeed, there was a
sense in which Britain was especiallyvulnerable to the threat of revolution because
of the scale of economic transformation that it faced in agriculture and industry
which were of a kind that is often accompanied by social unrest. Parliament
19. Cf Jenkins and Sherman, Collective Bargaining (1977), ch.1.
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responded to the threat of political upheaval through repressive measures
designed to prohibit any kind of non-state-sponsored collective action. The
Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 were intended to prohibit a wide range of
organisations. They are chiefly remembered for their effect on the infant trade
union movement.20
The Acts may be seen as a refusal to recognise any significance in the concept of
organised labour, but this view is difficult to sustain because if trade unions were
not thought to represent a threat, there would have been little point in prohibiting
them. It is more likely that the state perceived them as a threat to the established
economic order, and therefore as a threat to existing political authority. The
Combination Acts were a crude attempt to hold that threat in abeyance. The
important point to notice is the perception of that threat.
In 1824 the Acts were repealed, but this did not result from any change in the
perception of threat, nor from a sudden outbreak of liberalism.21 There was no
intention to encourage the unrestricted organisation of labour. In fact, the Act of
1824was probably little more than an alternative technique of repression, based on
the theory that trade unions were popular precisely because they were banned and
somehow mysterious. It was hoped that the end of prohibition would cause the
'forbidden' fruit to wither.22 Parliament retained its apparent belief in a threat to
established order - the critical relationship between government and sectional
interest was recognised and the intention to neutralise that threat remained. All
that had changed was the preferred technique of repression. In any event,
industrial action remained legally difficult. There was no real evidence of
liberalism. In fact 1824 saw an outbreak of militancy among the workforce and
1825 saw further legislation which created new and very broad criminal offences in
respect of industrial action.23
The criminal lawwas not the only hazard facing trade unions during this early
phase. The civil courts ensured that even if it was no longer illegal to belong to a
trade union, the unions themselves would face serious organisational difficulties.
Traditionally, trade unions have always seen themselves as unincorporated
associations - loose, voluntary organisations with minimum legal content beyond
the contract of membership embodied in the rulebook.24 Due to the nature and
purpose of the union, it was inevitable that the contract would require some
submersion of individual rights in the interests of the whole. Of course, this had
the effect of restraining individual freedom of contract. The courts regarded this
as an unlawful restraint of trade and consequently held that the union rulebook
was unenforceable.25 It may be that the courts took this view because of their
20. Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism 3rd ed. (1976), pp.25-29.
21. Combination Laws Repeal Act 1824.
22. Pelling, supra n.20, pp.29-32.
23. Combination Laws Repeal Amendment Act 1825.
24. See s.,2(1) Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 though, practically speaking, this may have
been superseded by more recent legislative developments.
25. See Hornby v. Close, supra n.12.
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supposed obsession with individual freedom. It is equally possible that they saw the
common law of restraint of trade as a means of minimising the perceived threat to
established order by making union rules unenforceable in the hope that the unions
themselves would dissolve into internal anarchy.
So long as trade unions remained simple bodies, bound together by a loyalty
born from adversity or sponsored by wealthy philanthropists and committed to
social change,26 this legal technicality mayhave presented fewproblems. However,
the growth of less radical but more sophisticated craft unions in the middle of the
19th century saw an increase in the complexityof union government. 27The "New
Model" unions also emphasised the provision of friendly society benefits - a
system of organised savingwhich did not indicate a commitment to the destruction
of civilisation as it was then known. Superficially, these were not threatening
developments. Indeed,' so far as the establishment was concerned, they must have
represented a considerable improvement upon the syndicalism of earlier years.
"New Model" unionism involved trade union officials in the administration of
large sums of money. The unenforceable character of union rules did not help
them, and this represented one of their most serious grievances.
At the same time, the influence of trade unions on the economy also grew. They
succeeded in organising the "aristocracy of labour" - the railwaymen, the
engineers and other groups of workers whose co-operation was vital to continuing
national prosperity, and who had an interest in it. The representatives of the state
could be forgiven for thinking that the threat of organised labour was diminishing.
Instead, it was in the proce;is of assimilating itself into the complex system of
sectional and national interests that seem to be at the core of British government.
Can it be a coincidence that it was at this stage, at the end of the 1860s, that
government began to take account of this change of atmosphere and to listen to the
trade union movement?
Phase II - recognition and tolerance
Paradoxically, the problems of mid-19th century trade unionism came to the
attention of government because of an outbreak of industrial violence in Sheffield.
In 1867, a Royal Commission was instructed to examine the issues.28 Note has
already been taken of some of its conclusions, which seem to have been based on
the principle of laissez faire or economic freedom.
The apparent permanence and considerable economic power of the emergent
trade union movement concentrated government minds on the need to remove
some of the legal disabilities resulting from judicial decisions like that in Hornby v.
Close.29 Both the state and the sectional interest of organised labour had an interest
in achieving some kind of modus vivendi.
26. E.g., Robert Owen's Grand National Consolidated Trade Union of the 18305.
27. Pelling, supra n.20, chAo
28. Royal Commission on Trade Unions 1867-69.
29. See, supra, n.25.
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The legislative result of this change of atmosphere is to be found in the Trade
Union Acts of 187130and 187631which were designed principally to mitigate the
common law of restraint of trade. The effect of the 1871 Act was to bring some
kinds of trade union rules within the protection of the ordinary law of contract by
exempting them from the law of restraint of trade and allowing them to be
enforced in the courts.32However, the exemption was qualified in that it would not
apply to any rule designed to oblige the member to break the contract of service
that bound him to his employer.33The Act of 1871 also introduced a system of
voluntary registration for trade unions. Those whose rules met certain formal
requirements could register as friendly societies under an existing statutory
scheme.34 Both the unions and the state gained advantages here. The unions
acquired various fiscal advantages which assisted them in administration of
financial benefits, while government acquired a valuable source of information
about a powerful sectional interest, and some input into its affairs.35This may have
indicated some recognition by Parliament that trade unions were permanent and
powerful. It also indicated a willingness to do business with them. Economic and
political developments, not least the extension of the franchise to the very people
whom the unions existed to represent, made the need for some kind of relationship
pressing.36
The Trade Union Act 1871 was the basis of the law of organised labour for a
century.37But, as Folke Schmidt points out, government acceptance of the fact of
trade unionism should not be seen as encouragement of it.
"The laws on industrial action enacted in the 100 years between the Trade
Unions Act 1871 and the Industrial Relations Act 1971 were based upon the
idea of toleration. The fact that the trade unions were protected did not mean
that they were loved by those in the establishment; certainly, the judges were
critical and wanted to restore the law to what it was before 1871."38
It is certainly true that between 1871 and about 1910, the courts used the
legislation of the 1870s in surprising ways. For example, the withdrawal of criminal
conspiracy through the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 was
without prejudice to the judicial discovery of the tort of conspiracy in Quinn v.
30. 34-35 Victoria c.31
31. 39-40 Victoria c.22.
32. Trade Union Act 1871, section 3.
33. Section 4.
34. Section 6.
35. In the sense that there were formal criteria for the validity of the rules. In the absence of such
validity, the union could not register: see section 14 and Schedule 1.
36. See Representation of the People Act 1867.
37. Until its repeal by the Industrial Relations Act 1971.
38. Schmidt, (1974) 3 I.L.). 69.
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Leatham a few years later.39 Perhaps even more interesting was the attitude of the
courts to trade unions as institutions at the beginning of the 20th century.
A number of distinguished scholars have doubted the importance of the
supposedly sterile issue of the organisational status of trade unions, perhaps
because it bears the stigma oflegalistic abstraction.4o However, the ways in which
Parliament and the courts have defined and analysed their legal status may provide
a useful indication of more general attitudes. There is a clear difference between
seeing trade unions as loose, voluntary associations with minimum legal content
and seeing them as sophisticated statutory or corporate bodies, endowed with
valuable rights and encumbered with serious obligations both to their members,
and to the rest of the world.
This issue was addressed by the House of Lords in the famous Ta.lfVale Railway
case.41 The crucial question was whether a trade union, registered under the 1871
Act, could sue and be sued as an organisation in its own name, in the same way as a
corporation. The traditional view was that this was not possible, because unions
were seen as simple unincorporated associations with no separate legal
personality.42 In the course of argument before the House of Lords, counsel for
the defendant trade unions submitted that:
"A trade union is not a corporation. It is like a club, not a legal entity: and
there are good reasons for this view. If the society can be sued as such, the
funds intended for the benefit of widows and orphans can be reached and
perhaps exhausted in consequence of improper and illegal acts of the society's
officers. ,,43
Obviously, this statement accords with the traditional view that the union could
not be seen as a legal entity. Its only legal content was thought to be the contractual
nature of its rules. That was the basis of the decision in Hornby v. Close44 and of the
provisions of the 1871 Act. Lord Brampton, however, departed from this view and
argued that the legislation of the 1870s had elevated trade unions on to a more
sophisticated legal plane. In his view, a registered trade union was a "newly
created corporate body created by statute, distinct from the unincorporated trade
unions consisting of many thousands of separate individuals."45 Accordingly, a
registered trade union, like a corporation, could sue and be sued in its own name.
Its funds became available to satisfY judgment and to purge its contempt of court,
and in many respects this is still good law.
39. [1901] A.C. 495; see also Temperton v. Russell [1893] 1 QB. 715 (trade union sponsored industrial
action amounting to the tort ofinducing a breach of contract) and}. Lyons and Sons v. Wilkins [1896] 1
Ch. 811 (picketing amounting to the tort of nuisance.)
40. See Wedderburn, supra n.4.
41. Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Russell, supra n.39; if. Duke of BedfOrdv. Ellis [1893] A.C. 1.
43. [1901J A.C. 426, at p.435.
44. Supra n.25.
45. [1901J A.C. 426, at p.442.
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The significance of Lord Brampton's view became clearer nine years later in
Amalgamated Society of Railway Seroants v. Osborne.46 In this case, a registered
union had decided to maintain a political fund to be financed through a levyon its
members. Osborne, a member of the union, challenged the legalityof the fund and
of its purpose.
The House of Lords seized upon the notion that the registered union was a kind
of statutory quasi-corporation and used it to assert a wide jurisdiction to review
trade union rules and activities to ensure that they were consistent with the
legislation. Lord Halsbury took the view that the Acts of 1871 and 1876 contained
an exhaustive definition of permissible union conduct.47 Parliament, it seemed,
had created a new species - the registered trade union - and had empowered it to
represent its members in matters oflabour relations. Its brief did not extend to any
kind of political activity. The union was like any other corporate body, allowed to
exist and function through privileges conceded to it by the state which retained the
right to supervise and restrain its conduct through the courts. And just as the
courts were entitled to restrain a corporation from any action ultra vires its charter,
statute or memorandum of association, so they were entitled to prevent a
registered union from acts not permitted by the Trade Union Acts. Lord
Macnaghten summarised the argument:
"It is a broad and general principle that companies incorporated by statute for
special purposes and societies, whether incorporated or not, which owe their
status to an Act of Parliament, having their objects and powers defined
thereby cannot apply their funds to any purpose foreign to the purposes for
which they were not established or embark on any undertaking in which they
were not intended by Parliament to be concemed.,,48
Much of this has been dismissed as mere "Tory Law", an indication of
establishment hostility towards organised labour.49 It is possible that TaffVale and
Osborne represent the consequences of the individualistic obsessions of the
common law which make it incapable of constructing rational labour laws. That
political preference, rather than legal reasoning, led to these decisions is now
regarded as axiomatic.5o The 1880s and 1890s had seen the organisation of
unskilled labour into trade unions, made militant by economic recession and more
reminiscent of the syndicalist organisations of the 1820s and 1830s than of the
craft unions whose interests had been vindicated in 1871.51 Also, the franchise was
46.A.S.R.S. v. Osborne [191OJ A.C:. 87.
47. Ibid., at p.92.
48. Ibid., at p.94.
49. Similar sentiments were expressed by trade unionists recently on the steps of the Royal Courts of
Justice after they had heard the Court of Appeal decline to remove an injunction against a proposed
national dock strike. A few days later the decision was reversed by the House of Lords.
50. See J. A. G. Griffith, supra n.8.
51. Pelling, supra n.20, ch.6.
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extended to the point of universal male suffrage.52 "Lib-Lab" and even "Labour"
candidates had been elected to Parliament.53 This was the end of an era. Perhaps a
conservative judiciary hoped to restrain its demise, or even to ease the
transformation by restraining trade unions, to prevent them from becoming a
sectional interest capable of challenging those equally sectional interests that were
represented by the ruling establishment of the 19th century. However, in Osborne
Lord Shaw counselled caution and urged that a sense of perspective was important
in considering the true significance of the Trade Union Acts. He remarked that:
"Long before the statutes of 1871 and 1876 were enacted trade unions were
things in being the general features ofwhich were familiar to the public mind.
They were associations of men bound together for common ends. Statutes
did not set them up and speaking for myself, I have some hesitation in
construing language of statutory recognition as a definition imposing such
hard and fast restrictive limits as would cramp the natural developments of
the living organism. ,,54
.Apparently, Lord Shaw saw the Acts as an attempt to assist existing trade
unions, not to establish them in a new form and then to regulate them through the
legal system. His was the minority view. The orthodox view of these cases is that
they represent the best possible reasons why the state and the law should keep
their distance from the field oflabour relations. It was in the House of Lords in the
first decade of the 20th century that the seeds of doctrines of abstentionism and
a!Jtonomy of Labour Law were sown.
Equally, these elderly and seemingly reactionary judgments and the
quasi-corporate theory of labour organisation that they produced seem to contain
the seeds of the notion that trade unions are far too important to be left to their
own devices. The thoughts of Halsbury and Macnaghten are, perhaps, inherent in
the controversial judgments of Lord Denning speaking 50, 60, and 70 years
later. 55 The idea that there may be an ideal, defined legal relationship between
organised labour and constitutional government is as central to the story of Labour
Law in the second half of the 20th century as is the relationship between capital
and labour. The battle lines of abstentionism and legalism had been drawn, but
first there was a lull in the proceedings.
Phase III - 1910-1960: a period of tranquillity
At first sight, the period 1910 to about 1960 seems anything but tranquil. The
relationship between government and organised labour developed in a variety of
ways.
52. Representation of the People Act 1884.
53. Pelling, supra n.20, ch.6.
54. Osborne, supra n.46, at p.107.
55. See, e.g., Lee v. Showmens Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB. 329; Breen v.Amalgamated Engineering
Union [1972] 2 QB. 175, and Chea/lv.A.P.E.x [1983] QB. 126.
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In the first place, it is reasonably clear that the judicial view of trade unions was
not wholly shared by Parliament, especially during the period of Liberal
domination that lasted from 1906 until after World War I. The Trade Disputes
Act of 1906 gave trade unions a wide immunity against any tortious liability that
might arise from trade disputes, 56 and to a large extent this neutralised the most
obvious adverse effects of Quinn v. Leatham and Taff Vale. The Trade Disputes
Act 191357 mitigated Osborne by permitting the unions to maintain political funds.
But although Parliament did much to mitigate the practical effects of these
decisions, it did little to discredit the organisational theory of quasi-incorporation
that made them possible.58 The concept of a concessionary relationship between
the state and the trade unions, regulated through the courts, remained. It may be
that Parliament simply acted to minimise the chance of conflict between labour
and the law. There was an abstention from conflict rather than an abstention from
legalism.
That is not to say that conflict was absent from this period, for during the 1920s
the coal miners and transport workers emerged as the 'crack troops' of organised
labour, confronting the government and its economic policies on a number of
occasions between 1910 and 1926, most notably during the General Strike.
During the strike the union movement showed, at the very least, that it had the
potential to mobilise the interests of labour to paralyse the economy, though this
potential was not,actually realised in 1926. Soon afterwards, the Great Depression
began ,to bite. Inevitably, the power of organised labour diminishes when demand
for labour is flat. In 1927, the atmosphere of tentative collective laissez faire that
had prevailed since the Trade Disputes Act 1906 changed. The Trade Disputes
Act 1927 restricted the validity of the political fund by emphasising the rights of
the individual over the interests of the collective entity.59 It also prohibited political
strikes.6o The legal sub-structure of Taff Vale and Osborne was revived. Trade
unions would be allowed to exist and to function provided that they restricted
themselves to the conduct of industrial relations.61 However, the representatives of
the state were wary of going too far down the road of regulation. The forces of
labour had succeeded in creating a viable political party. At a time of instability in
the party system, a radical attack on the unions might have swept the Labour Party
into power.62
The two world wars in our period inevitablyled to a great deal of social change.
In particular, the relationship between trade unions and the state altered because
56. 6 Edward 7, c.47.
57. 2-3 Geo. 5, c.30.
58. But see Trade Union ACI 1913, section 1 of which limits the importance of the statutory objects
specified in the 1871 Act. However, this was subject to section 2 which prohibited the Registrar from
registering a union unless it was within the statutory objects.
59. Especially sections 2, 3, and 4.
60. Section 1.
61. Subject to n.58 supra.
62. The Labour Party formed governments in 1924 and 1929 but on neither occasion could it be said
that it swept into office.
103
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
of the imperative need for national unity. During both world wars, government
assumed wide powers to direct the economy, to control labour and to suspend
collective. bargaining.63 The extent of regulation was enormous. In the
circumstances, it is not surprising .that organised labour was prepared to accept
this. It is surprising that this co-operation broke down on so very few occasions.64
This new, very close relationship between government and trade unions was
especially significant during World War II when trade unionists like Ernest Bevin
became leading figures in the coalition government. They were able administrators
and they could deliver the co-operation of their members. They were also able to
demonstrate that a kind of socialism was viable during wartime, leading to an
expectation that collectivismwould be helpful during peacetime toO.65This period
continued through to the election of the first independently viable Labour
government in 1945 and, arguably, even beyond its final defeat in 1951. The
Trade Disputes Act 1927 was repealed in 1946 so that the law returned to the
collective laissezfaire that had prevailed between 1906 and 1927.66 But, again, the
system of collective Labour Lawwas not the subject of any radical overhaul.67 The
spirit of Lord Halsbury still hovered and the seeds of doctrinal conflict remained.
The conflict did not arise between 1945 and 1951 because, while trade unionists
were in government, there was no need for fundamental disagreement between the
sectional interest and that of the state. Also, on the economic front there was a very
real sense in which the war was still being fought. The task of reconstruction was
enormous. The drive for exports and simple need to feed, clothe and house the
population were paramount.
Friendly and co-operative relations between the state and the trade unions
continued through the early years of the Conservative government which took
office in 1951. Senior ministers had worked with prominent trade unionists during
the period of wartime coalition. Subject to the issue of nationalisation there was
much common ground between them.68
It seems clear that, during this period, a relationship of some kind existed
between government and trade unions, and that this was thought to be important
and positive by both sides. Legally, it continued to rest upon the Trade Unions Act
1871 which could mean different things to different people, as the disagreement
between Lords McNaghten and Shaw in Osborne shows.69 But the political climate
and the personalities of the time made extensive legal reg1!.lationof trade unions,
63. In both 1915 and 1940 strikes and lockouts became criminal offences. During World War II, free
collective bargaining was suspended and replaced with a system of compulsory arbitration.
64. E.g., the Kent miners strike of 1941 which was settled: see Wedderburn, supra, n.4, p.29.
65. Some of the policies and proposals of the wartime coalition became the basis of a postwar political
consensus.
66. Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1946.
67. Indeed, the express purpose of the repeal was to restore "all enactments and rules of law" affected
by the Trade Disputes Act 1927.
68. Pelling, supra n.20, pp.257-260.
69. See, supra, text pp.101, 102.
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through the 1871 Act or otherwise, unnecessary. But this p~riod of tranquillity did
not last.
Phase IV - the 1960s: the beginning of conflict
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, British society began a fundamental
reassessment of the role of trade unionism, at a time when society as a whole was
in the process of change. The cost of the Second World War and the process of
decolonisation had changed the ground rules of the British economy. The need for
Britain to "pay its way" became a dominant political theme, and the control of
living standards became the core of economic policy.7oClearly, there was a tension
between this theme and the need for trade unions to represent the rising
aspirations of their members. While government developed a strong interest in the
policy of pay restraint, the unions felt themselves to be obliged to oppose that
policy for the benefit of their members and in order to preserve free collective
bargaining. The relationship between the state and trade unions now contained a
very basic and direct conflict of interest. Government believed that pay restraint
was clearly in the national interest. Equally clearly, trade unions saw the imposition
of pay restraint by the state as contrary to the interest of their members. This
conflict dominated the atmosphere of the relationship, and its legal content, for the
next 20 years.
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, government was reluctant to
use the law as an instrument of its policy towards the unions. Certainly, there were
judicial decisions which re-emphasised that trade unions, despite their 'privileges'
were not 'above the law' and that there was a legal presumption against strikes.71
Nevertheless, Parliament attempted to avoid conflict and to promote co-operation
by 'oiling the wheels' of the existing relationship, and drawing upon existing good
will. The government set up a National Economic Development Council which
drew its members from government, capital and organised labour and was chaired
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.n Its function was, and still is, to identify
. obstacles to economic development and ways of overcoming them. This may be
seen as a component of a new technique for the formulation of economic policy,
relying upon negotiation between the state and the major economic interests.
To begin with, this technique was not conspicuously successful. It was difficult
to build a consensus around the policy of pay restraint, which remained unpopular.
Unfortunately, the validity of the whole exercise depended upon achieving such a
consensus.73 Pay restraint was inimical to the most basic interests of organised
labour and, to some e"1ent, it was contrary to the interests of capital as well.
Because of this diversity of interest, the Conservative governments of the late
1950s and 1960s were forced tu adopt alternative policies. Interestingly, they did
70. E.g., Selwyn Lloyd's Pay Pause of 1962.
71. See, e.g., Lee v. Showmens Guild, supra n.55, and Thompson f5 Co v. Deakin [19521Ch.646.
72. Created under the auspices of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
73. Pelling, supra n.68.
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not proceed along the course of legal regulation of collective bargaining. Instead,
they were forced to rely upon short term fiscal and monetary adjustments as a way
of managing demand and controlling the economy; again, without notable success.
The Labour Party returned to power in 1964, but their predecessor's problems
remained. The crucial question was how to achieve export led economic growth.
For the Wilson government, restraining consumption at home was only a part of
the solution. The new administration also placed a great deal of faith in the
modernisation and central planning of the economy. The basic concept of the
NEDC was expanded and a new Department of Economic Affairs was created. Its
influence was to rival that of the Treasury; its brief was to plan for and promote
strong and sustainable economic growth. The co-operation of capital and of
organised labour was plainly crucial to its success. It seems that trade unions were
prepared to accept the desirability of planned economic growth in principle. In
practice, there were serious' difficulties. Financial problems, resulting partly from
the instability of sterling, caused inflation. In an inflationary environment, it
became very hard for union leaders to restrain the expectations of their
members.74
In the middle and late 1960s there were serious national strikes among the
railwayworkers, the dockers and the merchant seamen. Again, government did not
choose to use the legal system to meet the problem.75 Instead, the search for
informal consensus continued, albeit in a more public and perhaps desperate way
than before. State intervention took the form of persuasion, emphasising that the
national interest required restraint from sectional interests. Many trade union
leaders sympathised with the core of what ministers were saying, but it remained
difficult for them to reconcile the proposed sublimation of their members'
interests with their basic function, the promotion of those interests. In short, those
leaders were unable to deliver the co-operation of their members.76 The principle
of abstentionism, and the loose organisational structure that it allowed unions to
retain, meant that they could not be controlled - even by their own officials. The
co-operative relationship between government, labour and capital began to
crumble under the weight of spontaneous and unofficial industrial action. So did
the government's economic policy.
In this climate, it is not surprising that policy-makers began to doubt the sense
of collective laissez faire and co-operative economic planning, or at least their
ability to exist together. To many, it seemed that a new, more formal set of
relationships was needed: between labour and capital, and collective bargaining
and the law. In some minds at least, thoughts of Taff Vale and Osborne revived.77
74. For an account of this period see Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970 -A Personal
Record, ch.l.
75. Subject to the Trade Disputes Act 1965 which had the relativelynarrow purpose of overruling the
controversial decision of the House of Lords in Rookes v. Rookes [1964] A.C. 1192.
76. See Pelling, supra n.20, pp.262-266.
77. See, e.g., A Giants Strength (Inns of Court Conservative Association, 1958).
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A Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Donovan, reported its findings in
1968.78 In its view, the complex relationships between labour and capital,
collective bargaining and economic policy could only improve and stabilise if
relations improved and stabilised on the shop floor. The views of union members
were subverting the vital process of collective bargaining and turning it into the
great imponderable of economic policy. Shop floor tensions were the source of
unofficial industrial action which, in tum, was a cause of economic dislocation.
Having identified the flaw in relations between competing economic interests and
the national interest, the Donovan Commission had to recommend remedial
action. The Commission reaffirmed the virtues of the policy of abstentionism and
the inadequacy oflegalism as an approach to industrial relations. However, it also
proposed the enactment of Industrial Relations legislation which would formalise
and strengthen collective bargaining. It was thought that government had a role,
but that it should be value - neutral. It would not claim a controlling interest, but it
would create machinery for the registration of collective agreements in the
interests of consistency and certainty. It would also act as a source of information
and advice. None of this was outside of the supposed 'tradition' of abstentionism.
However, there were other proposals which contemplated a much more direct and
legalistic relationship between the state and the unions. For example, it was
proposed that union rules should conform with statutory standards - formal and
substantive, and that union members should acquire the legal right not to be
unfairly excluded or expelled from their union, as a corollary to the right not to be
unfairly dismissed by an employer. These were legalistic proposals contemplating
the development of organisational norms by the state, and their embodiment in the
law. The Donovan Report is often cited as the central text of the abstentionist
analysis, yet it can also be seen as a vindication of the legalistic view in Taff Vale
and Osborne. The Commission was prepared to propose quite extensive legal
regulation of collective bargaining, and of the trade unions themselves.
The trade union movement reacted to these proposals with considerable
suspicion and some alarm at the prospect of legal involvement in collective
bargaining, and in their own internal affairs. So far as they were concerned, the law
should be used to underpin collective bargaining by guaranteeing minimum
conditions of employment and the right to strike, but it should go no further than
that. 79
The government, convinced that a new approach was needed, published a
White Paper entitled "In Place of Strife".8o Ostensibly, the document adopted the
Donovan analysis, but it also proposed that the role of the law should be
strengthened. The newly created office of Secretary of State for Employment and
Productivity would carry with it a power to impose a conciliation pause before
78. Cmnd. 3623.
79. For a more detailed summary of the principal recommendations and of trade union reactions to
them see Balfour, Unions and Ihe Law (1973), ch.2.
80. Cmnd. 3888.
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unofficial industrial action. Trade unions would be obliged to ballot their members
before sanctioning official action. New statutory duties would be enforceable by
way of fines, through an Industrial Board.
"In Place of Strife" contemplated an enhanced role for government in the field
of industrial relations. The aim seems to have been to use the law to modernise
and plan collective bargaining in order to modernise and plan the economy.
However, the proposals failed because of the inability of the Parliamentary Labour
Party and of the Cabinet itself to unite around them. The unions were vehemently
opposed to the creation of a new, more interventionist legal regime. The Labour
Party was unable to overcome that opposition. In place of introducing legislation,
Parliament was forced to accept a "solemn and binding" undertaking from the
TUC that it would use its best endeavours to prevent or resolve unofficial strikes.
It would not accept any legal intervention in the internal affairs of unions, nor any
legal restraints upon their freedom of action.8l
As Parliament was unable to act, government was forced to depend for the
success of its policies upon the goodwill of a sectional interest. This was in stark
contrast to the position in 1871 when trade unions had to rely upon Parliament to
carve out their place in the legal system. For the first time it was possible to say that
in the relationship between the state and organised labour, it was the sectional
interest that had the upper hand. The economic and constitutional tensions that
were contained in this development erupted into conflict in the decade that
followed.
Phase V - the 1970s: crisis and experiment
When a new Conservative government took office in the summer of 1970, it saw
itself as having received a clear mandate to use the law to reform industrial
relations. There had been a 'legalistic' school within the Conservative Party
throughout the 20th century. While in opposition, the Party had published an
'alternative' to "In Place of Strife" entitled "Fair Deal at Work".82 Its recipe for
reform contemplated a substantial injection oflegal supervision oflabour relations.
While the unions continued to preach the creed of abstentionism, government
became committed to the policy of legalism.
The Industrial Relations Act 1971 drew heavily upon "Fair Deal at Work"
which was in tum influenced by the federal labour relations law of the United
States. American labour law depends upon organised collective bargaining, and
there is a sense in which Congress is responsible for its existence. However, the
whole process and the trade unions themselves are subject to a wide range of legal
obligations, and to the supervision of the National Labor Relations Board and the
81. For a first hand account of this period see Wilson, supra nA, chs. 28-31. See also Balfour, supra
n.79, ch.3. and Jenkins, The Bailie of Downing Street (1970).
82. Conservative Political Centre, 1968.
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Secretary of Labor. M3 An atmosphere of economic and political crisis, a belief in
legalism and the transatlantic influence - these were the conditioning factors that
led to the Industrial Relations Act.
The provisions of the Act are discussed exhaustively elsewhere, but its major
principles should be mentioned.84 As has been said, the Trade Union Act 1871
had created a system of voluntary registration of trade unions. The 1971 Act
enhanced the importance of registration. A "union" that failed to register would
not be a "trade union" at all for the purposes of the Act. Registration was not
possible unless the union rules appeared to a Chief Registrar to be fair,
responsible and democratic. If at any time the rules failed to meet the statutory
criteria, the Chief Registrar could apply to the new National Industrial Relations
Court for an order cancelling any existing registration.85 The significance of this
new, stronger concept of registration is obvious. It meant that the state, through
the Chief Registrar and the court, would have power over trade union government
to an extent that was far greater than anything contemplated by the law, before or
since.
The theme of legal intervention in the internal affairs of unions was repeated in
a statutory right to membership or non-membership of a trade union.86 It was in
the nature of a voluntary association that it had the right to regulate its own
membership - this was a part of the culture of abstentionism. Similarly, the
efficiency of collective bargaining was thought to depend upon solidarity,
frequently enforced through Union Membership Agreements. The Act moved
away from those principles.87 Many saw this as an attempt to impose the lawyer's
conception of individual liberty upon organisations which, by their very nature,
take a more collectivistviewof freedom. Another effect of the 1971Act was to give
Labour Law its own distinctive legal system. Collective bargaining and industrial
action were to be analysed by reference to a code of Unfair Industrial Practices,
based on the Unfair Labor Practices of US labour law.88 These new concepts
were to be applied through a system of Industrial Tribunals and a National
Industrial Relations Court.89 The tribunals had existed since 1964, with very
limited jurisdiction. The NIRC was an innovation. It was exclusively concerned
with Labour Law and, like the Industrial Tribunals, was composed of a legally
qualified chairman (in this case a High Court Judge) and two 'wingmen' with
industrial relations experience. The court was of similar status to the High Court
83. See National Labor Relations Act 1935 as amended in 1947 and the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act 1959, 29 U.S.c. s.152 et seq..
84. See, e.g., R. Simpson and J. Wood, Industrial Relations arId the 1971 Act (1971) and, as a
retrospective, Kahn Freund, (1974) 3 IL.J. 186.
85. Industrial Relations Act 1971, Part IV.
86. Sections 5 and 6.
87. The Act abolishes the device of the pre-entry closed shop but permitted the adoption of the
American device of the 'Agency shop': see sections 7 and II-18.
88. Sections 54 and 55 of I.R.A. 1971; if National Labor Relations Act 1935, 29 U.S.c. sections
158(a)5, 158(d) et al ..
89. I.R.A. 1971, Part VI.
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and had the right to imprison or fine for contempt of court - a power that it used to
disastrous effect during its brief life.9o
The Industrial Relations Act was a bold attempt to regularise and supervise the
conduct of industrial relations. The role of lawwas increased, and an attempt was
made to systematise it. The government took the view that it was responsible for
economic policy and for the protection of the national interest. It also had the right
to require that industrial relations be conducted in an efficient and orderly way.
Law appeared to be the best way of ensuring that they were.
Although law, as an instrument of policy, can influence and harness processes
and interests and can act as an umpire between them, it cannot define them. If a
new system of law is to survive it must have the co-operation of those who are
affected by it. Clearly, the required co-operation was not forthcoming from the
trade union movement. The Industrial Relations Act failed because of organised
opposition. This was largely passive. On the whole, the unions simply failed to
acknowledge the Act's existence.9I There were a number of emotionally charged
legal actions which brought the Act into disrepute. The state had committed itself
to legalism and to offering a highly organised system of industrial relations. The
offer was not only resoundingly rejected, it was never seriously considered. The
Industrial Relations Act jeopardised relations between the government and the
trades union movement, though there is evidence that the real objection was to the
Act's legalism and not to the Conservative government itself.92
Between 1972 and 1974, the economy staggered from crisis to crisis. The price
of oil increased dramatically, there was runaway inflation and a series of national
strikes, culminating in the miners' strike of 1973-4. In February 1974, the Prime
Minister sought a dissolution of Parliament and fought the ensuing general
election on the emotive issue of "Who governs Britain?" By now, the electorate
could be forgiven for thinking that no-one could governwithout the consent of the
unions. The Labour Party was able to form a minority government. One of its first
measures was the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act.93 In October 1974, the
new government was confirmed in office with a parliamentary majority of only 3
seats.
Through its own bitter experiences in the late 1960s, and those of the
Conservatives, the Labour Party seems to have concluded that economic policy
and pay restraint were only obtainable with the active co-operation of the unions.
Legal regulation of collective bargaining was thought to be unworkable. Indeed,
some Conservatives had also come around to this view.94 The relationship
90. See Churchman v.Joint Shop Stewards Committee [1972] 1W.L.R. 1094. For a readable account of
some of the difficult cases that arose from the Act, see Lord Denning, The Closing Chapter (1983),
pp.164-177.
91. A colleague who taught a course for shop stewards in the early 1970s found that many would turn
their backs to her whenever the Act was mentioned.
92. See the reported remarks of Lord Carr in Arnold, supra n.18, pp.22 and 23.
93. Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, s.1.
94. Young, One of Us (1989), pp.108-11O.
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between government and the trade union movement had to be placed on a new
footing. The Labour government approached the problem by emphasising the
concept of partnership and inviting the union movement to participate in the
creation and execution of economic policy. This approach was implemented
through the novel, device of the "Social Contract", an agreement by which the
unions promised pay restraint in return for the adoption of socialist policies, legal
guarantees of trade union independence and organisational rights and a code of
minimum workers' rights.95 Symbolically, the Trade Union and Labour Relations
Act 1974 provided that trade unions were not bodies corporate and that they were
not to be treated as if they were.96 Thus, the ghosts of Taff Vale and Osborne were
laid to rest, though some of their practical consequences remained.
A great deal of our modem Labour Law was created under the influence of the
Social Contract.97 For a time, both government and labour were able to deliver
their sides of the bargain. There was an absence of confrontation and inflation was
brought under control, but by 1978 the flaws in the Social Contract became
apparent. When an agreement comes under pressure it tends to fall apart, yet
where such pressure is exerted government has to make difficult decisions. If
government depends entirely upon an accommodation with a sectional interest, it
is vulnerable. Due to external pressures, the goverment was forced to cut public
expenditure and to take demand out of the economy. This was a result of powerful
sectional interests operating in the financial markets.98 Government was seen to be
reneging on its obligations under the Social Contract. In these difficult conditions,
the government was unable to agree on an appropriate level of pay increases with
the TUe. The Social Contract became an economic impasse. The state reverted to
the language of intervention and control.
The government tried to impose pay norms, and the courts restricted the
immunities of trade unions in respect of industrial action.99 In the autumn of 1978,
it was expected that the government would seek a new electoral mandate in order
to get the Social Contract back on course. It failed to do so, raising the suspicion
that it had lost touch with reality. During the winter, the tension between
government and organised labour resulting from pay policy exploded into a
"winter of discontent." The authority of the government, already tenuous because
of the lack of a parliamentary majority, crumbled.
The Social Contract was, in a sense, the high water mark of the concept of
abstentionism. Certainly, it involved a very close and direct relationship between
95. For an account of and views on this period see Arnold, supra n.18., chAo
96. Section 2(1).
97. E.g., Employment Protection Act 1975; Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974; Trade
Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 1976; Sex Discrimination Act 1975; Race Relations
Act 1976; Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.
98. Interests that were arguably vindicated by the intervention of the International Monetary Fund.
99. Especially the Court of Appeal while Lord Denning was the Master of the Rolls: see, e.g., B.B.C. v.
Hearn [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1004 and Express Newspapers v. McShane [1979] 1 W.L.R. 390. (H.L.). if.
McShane v. Express Newspapers [1979] I.R.L.R. 79 (C.A.).
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the government and organised labour, but the relationship was to be regulated by
negotiation and bargain rather than by law. To that extent, it was the antithesis of
Taff Vale, Osborne and the Industrial Relations Act 1971. In another sense,
however, the Conservative and Labour governments of the early 1970s had a
similar vision. Both believed in economic policy through the consent of sectional
interests. There is evidence that, on the whole, the trade unions and the Heath
government had the beginnings of a fruitful relationship. I If the Industrial
Relations Act had been given a chance, it might have become the basis of a kind of
social contract or tripartism, involving government, capital and labour. The
Labour government wanted the same kind of relationship, but set about creating it
in a different way, without law, because of the experience of the 1960s and its
'special relationship' with the unions. It is arguable that the story of the early 1970s
is the story ohwo attempts to build a 'corporate' state, based on the positive
agreement of national and sectional interests. The first attempt was legalistic. It
failed. The second was abstentionist. It failed too. The relationship between the
state and trade unions was in a state of crisis.
The 1980s - a new approach?
During the 1979 election campaign, James Callaghan instructed the electorate
that:
"The question you will have to.consider is whether we risk tearing everything
up at the roots."z
Apparently, some Conservatives were unimpressed by the corporatism and
collectivismof the 1970s. It was their intention to discard them. Plainly, this would
profoundly affect the relationship between the trade unions and the state, such as
it was. The new Prime Minister and her advisors believed that there was little
point in seeking consensus with the unions in the traditional sense. However, there
seems to have been a desire to change the union-government relationship into one
of "positive partnership".3 The question was, how to go about making that change.
The new government, after winning yet another general election fought on the
issue of union power, promised measured legal intervention in industrial relations
and in the internal affairs of trade unions. Some elements in the Conservative
Party were anxious not to plunge into a 'root and branch' reform of the kind that
had been attempted in the early 1970s.
The three Conservative governments that have held office since 1979 have
approached the perceived 'problem' of trade union power in two basic ways.
First, they have used economic policy. In the early 1980s the government
confronted inflation by attempting to control the money supply. Initially, this
deepened an existing world recession. High interest rates and a strong currency
1. See, supra, n.92.
2. Quoted in Young, supra n.94, p.l31.
3. Ibid., p.1I6.
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made it hard for British industry to compete abroad, and suppressed demand at
home. Because of this, industry shed labour. It has already been noted that when
demand for labour is weak, the power of organised labour is reduced. In this
climate, the problems of the 1970s were unlikely to recur, or at least to have the
same effects. It is questionable whether the decline in the power of the unions was
an intended or an unintended consequence of broader economic policy. It may be
that it was simply a welcome by-product. Thus, the relationship between the state
and organised labour was regulated, not by statute and judicial decisions, but by
the more mercurial laws of economics.
Secondly, the Conservative government has approached its relationships with
the unions through legislation. There have been four major Acts of Parliament,
and a fifth may be expected very soon.
The first was the Employment Act 1980. As well as restricting trade union
immunities in respect of industrial action,4 the 1980 Act reintroduced Donovan's
idea of a legally enforceable right to trade union membership. Initially, the right
not to be unreasonably excluded or expelled from a union applied only in limited
circumstances, i.e. where a Union Membership Agreement was in operation.5 Like
Donovan, "In Place of Strife", and the Industrial Relations Act 1971, this
represents state intervention in the internal affairs of unions. It reflects the
individualistic conception of trade union government preferred by lawyers as
demonstrated in, for example, Lord Denning's dissenting judgments in Breen v.
AEU6 and, after the 1980 Act, in Cheal/v. APEX.7
The second major legislativedevelopment was the Employment Act 1982 which
has the effect, inter alia, of limiting the legalityof union recognition requirements.8
Conceptually, the Acts of 1980 and 1982 echo the idea of the Unfair Industrial
Practice, which was a central feature of the Industrial Relations Act.
The Trade Unions Act 1984 was the most direct legal intervention in the
internal affairs of unions since 1971. Most importantly, the Act requires that trade
unions ballot their members before instructing them to take industrial action.9
Again, this echoes "In Place of Strife" and the 1971 Act. However, while earlier
proposals and enactments required that this obligation should be enforced by
government, the 1984 Act approached the problem of enforcement by a more
indirect route. The absence of a ballot would deprive the union of immunity
against any tortious liability that might arise from industrial action.]OSuch liability
could only be imposed at the suit of the victim of tort. In most cases, this would be
the employer with whom the union was in dispute. Thus, the state provides a legal
framework for those who wish to use it, but distances itself from the responsibility,
4. Section 17.
5. Section 4.
6. [1971] 2 QB. 175.
7. [1983] QB. 126.
8. Section 12.
9. Sections 10 and 11.
10. Section 10(1).
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and political minefieJd, of enforcement. Here, the old distinction between legalism
and abstentionism seems to blur. Parliament defines legal norms, but their
application is left to the participants in the process of industrial relations who may,
or may not, choose to go to court. The 1984Act also requires that all members of a
trade union's permanent executive committee should be elected by secret ballot. II
The Employment Act 1988 repeats and extends the theme of the 1984 Act. The
express aim of both Statutes was, and is, to enhance the power of individual trade
union members and to make union government accountable to those whom it
exists to serve.12 The 1988 Act tightens the requirements of election of the
Permanent Executive Committee,13 and gives individual members the right to
force a pre-industrial action ballot, through the courts,14 and of inspecting the
union's accounting recordsY Very importantly, the Act builds upon the
Employment Act 1980 by giving every trade union member the right not to be
unjustifiably disciplined. 16This is not restricted to members who are covered by a
Union Membership Agreement. Nor is the concept of "discipline" restricted to
exclusion or expulsion as it was in 1980. Also, while the concept of unreasonable
exclusion or expulsion in the 1980 Act was largely undefined, I 7 the 1988 Act
defines a number of circumstances in which disciplinary action will be deemed to
be unjustifiable. These include discipline for failure to support industrial action,
even if such action has been approved by ballot, and disciplinary action for
suggesting that there is impropriety in union government, unless that suggestion is
made in bad faith.18 In addition, a union member who wishes to use the legal
system to protect these rights may seek the assistance of a new Commissioner for
the Rights of Trade Union Members. 19
The Employment Act 1988, and by implication the Trade Union Act 1984, has
been criticised as "an objectionable intervention in trade union affairs".2oYet it is
notable that the legislation of the 1980s, though radical, is largely enforceable at
the suit of private persons - employers and individual trade union members.
Unlike "In Place of Strife" and the Industrial Relations Act, there are few new
regulatory powers in the Secretary of State for Employment. Indeed, it has been
II. Section I.





17. Except by reference to codes of practice issued periodically by the Secretary of State for
Employment.
18. Section 3(3).
19. Sections 19 and 20. The first case brought with the assistance of the Commissioner came before
the High Court on 26 June 1989 in the form of an application for an order to restrain industrial action
by the N.U.R. because of the allegedly defective conduct of the required ballot. The application was
rejected.
20. McKendrick, (1988) 17 I.J.L. 141.
114
THE CURIOUS HISTORY OF TRADE UNION LAW
suggested that that office may face abolition in the near future.21 There are no new
statutory bodies, with the exception of the Commissioner for the Rights of Trade
Union Members, and no new courts. Thus, although the law has been
reintroduced into industrial relations on a scale that has not been seen since 1971,
the government is careful to distance itself from the application of the lawwhich, it
seems, is the responsibility of the individuals and organisations that are affected by
it, and it is the individual that is emphasised most. The philosophies of legalism
and abstentionism seem to be finelybalanced, and there is a deafening silence as to
the nature of the relationship between trade unions and the state. By all accounts,
they now have very little to do with each other.22
In the late 1980s, the very idea of collective bargaining in the traditional,
industry-wide sense, seems to be under review and the courts are involved in
industrial conflict on a day-to-day basis. However, it is far from clear that this is
resulting in lower wage demands. As the economy overheats, and inflation returns,
some of the industrial problems of the 1970s seem to be retuming. By the end of
the decade it should be possible to make a preliminary judgment about the
efficiency of the new legal framework, as it is tested by resurgent industrial
conflict.
There is one aspect of legal development in the 1980s that is very striking. It is
the way in which, by increments, the broad policy of "In Place of Strife" and the
Industrial Relations Act 1971 has been implemented without the foundations of
the constitution being shaken. Trade unions, which never wished to exist as
corporate bodies, are now treated as if they were by the 1984 and 1988 Acts, in
spite of the protestations of section 2 of the Trade Unions and Labour Relations
Act 1974.23 Ballots must be held on a wide range of occasions. The policy of
legalism has been installed while ministers fastidiously maintain their distance.
What is remarkable is that this has become a rare subject of political consensus.24
In a sense, it is at least arguable that TaffVale, Osborne, "In Place of Strife" and the
Industrial Relations Act have been vindicated. It is even possible that they never
ever went away, and that the Social Contract was the aberration in the story. Will
the next stage be a movement towards 'positive' partnership?
21. Though it has been suggested by the Secretary of State for Employment that he may present a bill
designed to restrain strikes in essential public services.
22. On 28 June 1989, the then Secretary of State for Transport declined to intervene in the current
railway dispute, on the basis that it was for management and labour to resolve their own differences.
This maybe inconsistent with the suggestion in n.21, supra.A similar viewhas been taken in the context
of the ambulance workers' work to rule' of autumn/winter 1989.
23. Indeed, McKendrick, supra n.20, compares the provisions of the Employment Act with the model
'Table A' articles of association in the Companies Act 1985.
24. In that even the Labour Party is not publicly committed to the repeal of all the labour relations
legislation of the 1980s.
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Conclusion
As an historical survey all that has been said can only scratch the surface of the
long and complex development of collective labour law, but at the same time it is
possible to see the begining of some historical patterns. First, it appears that trade
union legislation has been as much the product of concern about the relationship
between public and sectional interests as of a desire to influence the operation of
the labour market. In fact there seems to be little evidence of a preoccupation with
industrial relations as such. On the whole, it seems that there has been more
interest in minimising the wider consequences of poor labour relations on the
economy and of trade union power on the ability of government to govern
according to its own perception of the public interest. At one extreme, the
Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 present a particularly crude example of all of
this and while the Trade Union Acts of 1871 and 1876 denote an important
change of attitude the law that they contained turned out to be as much about legal
control of trade unions as they were about liberalisation. More subtly, "In Place of
Strife", its successor the Industrial Relations Act 1971 and the Social Contract all
reflect, in different ways, a preoccupation with the need to govern effectivelywhile
bearing in mind the views and the power of organised labour. Taken at face value,
the legislation of the 1980s seems to have less to do with these preoccupations in
the sense that the unions seem to have been excluded from the corridors of power
to the extent that government does not consider itself to have an important
relationship with them at all. However, it is far from clear that this legislation
should be taken at its face value. In any event, the lessons of history may show that
the abstentionist view of industrial relations is destined to continuing
disappointment.
The second interesting pattern reflects the way in which the concerns of the
1960s and 1970s remain the concerns of the 1980s and the striking homogeneity
of the legislative approach to them. The early ideas of the Donovan Commission
which were reflected in "In Place of Strife" and the 1971 Act have been vindicated
in recent legislation to an extent that is surprising. Many of Donovan's proposals
which were so controversial at their inception are now firmly entrenched in the
law, in substance if not in form. In that context, the Social Contract of 1974 to
1978 may be seen either as an historical aberration or as an attempt to formalise an
idealised view of the pre-Donovan period. It was certainly an attempt to place
relations between the state and collective bargaining on to a secure footing. Like
most other attempts, it was hardly an unqualified success.
The history of trade union law in Britain has been unhappy and confused and
that fact alone may be a sufficient reason for taking the traditional abstentionist
view. As a theory it has certainly contributed more to British industrial relations
scholarship than any other. But history seems to indicate that it has always
operated as a hope or value judgment rather than as a description. Even during its
supposed heyday, as an official policy the spectre of legalism haunted the feast,
always ready to return if the industrial relations system and therefore the state
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came under pressure. Now it has returned with a vengeance. It was probably
knocking on policy makers' doors as early as the late 1950s.1t is unlikely to leave in
the near future and it is hard to be sure that it ought to. As it stands, a pause for
thought and sensible rationalisation and codification seem to present the best hope
for clarity of underlying principle and for a praiseworthy "phase VI" in the curious
history of collective labour law.
117
